Recalling Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s proclamation that Iranian military bases are off-limits with regard to nuclear installation inspections, Lawfare‘s Yishai Schwartz comments:
… some members of the P5+1 appear no less unyielding, with the French foreign minister telling his lawmakers, “France will not accept (a deal) if it is not clear that inspections can be done at all Iranian installations, including military sites.”
At first glance, Iran’s hesitation at allowing international inspectors access to its military sites might appear reasonable. But the history, law, and language of non-proliferation agreements lie squarely on the side of France. Concessions on this issue—even in the form of subjecting certain inspections to the approval of some kind of “joint commission”—would not only dramatically weaken any deal, but would actually constitute a major departure from long-standing principles of nuclear controls. …
Of course, no country liked the idea of foreign inspectors poking around their military bases. But each realized that the comprehensiveness of inspectors’ reach was crucial to the entire system. If there would be inspections-free zones, there could be no guarantee that states’ nuclear programs were peaceful. …
Throughout the years of sanctions and negotiations, Iran has chafed at restrictions and repeatedly demanded to be treated just like any other state. But in insisting on a special exemption denying IAEA access to military site, Iran is actually demanding special, privileged treatment. The fact that the p5+1 would even consider subjecting such visits to a “joint commission” of the IAEA represents a significant, and dangerous, departure from previous practice. The logic of the oversight system rests on the assumption that the IAEA Board of Governors holds ultimate authority to decide where its inspectors go, and that the Security Council serves as its enforcement mechanism. Playing with these details would gut the entire structure.
This is rather interesting in that last week Lawfare suggested the Iran deal could go off the rails without it being a disaster:
After a number of conversations with some of these critics, however, I’m increasingly convinced that there is an alternative, albeit a poorly articulated one. To be sure, it has question marks and uncertainties—and the deal currently being hammered out may yet offer the best balance of risks and benefits. But there is another side of the ledger. Here, then, is a roadmap to that alternative path.
First, American negotiators would have to allow the current round of negotiations to fail, but without blowing up or reneging on any already-made commitments. Doing so should not be too difficult. There are enough unresolved issues that adopting a hard (and reasonable) line on, say, the timing of sanctions relief or the reach of inspections would either force Iranian capitulation (good) or lead to an impasse—which from this perspective would be fine as well.
Perhaps Khamenei is paving that road for them. Yishai Schwartz continues:
The competing interpretation (and this is something about which far too few of the deal’s critics speak concretely) is that Iran will make some noise, but will actually seek a temporary stop-gap accommodation. It may build a few more centrifuges and reduce inspections by a marginal amount, and in return, the White House and its allies would mildly tighten some existing sanctions. Kirk-Menendez will remain on the shelf and Iran’s breakout time will continue to hover near the three-month mark. There will be Iranian violations and American threats, but both sides will keep their provocations below a certain escalatory threshold, and diplomats will resume talks under an arrangement roughly similar to the JPOA.
And, basically, a status quo. The important point to note is that Iran doesn’t have resources equivalent to the world’s, so status quo for us merely leaves us with irritating political questions (Obama doesn’t get the legacy he wants), while the Iranian government has more existential questions to consider, between this and its food and water problems. Of course, one is tempted to say that the Iranian government will find a way to stay on top. But then, I felt the same way about the East German government, as did just about everyone else – until they collapsed.
