Stephan Haggard on Lawfare covers recent events in North Korea. Perhaps most worrying is the missile test and its context:
But missile tests are not just for show; they are ultimately about the development of capabilities. The acceleration of North Korea’s testing under Kim Jong-un—neatly documented in an infographic from the CSIS Missile Defense Project—has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The numbers are straightforward: four tests in 2012, eight in 2013, 18 each in 2014 and 2015 and 23 in 2016. The majority of these 70 tests—42—have been short-range Scud variants. But in 2016, the tests included the long-range “satellite” launch in February, a succession of tests of intermediate-range Musudan missiles (at least one of which succeeded), an intermediate-range Nodong that landed within 125 miles of Japanese waters, and several submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, as well as a ground test of a new rocket engine. A crucial aspect of these tests is the shift from liquid- to solid-fueled engines. John Schilling explains the implications:
[Solid fuel rockets] require little maintenance, can survive rough handling and off-road transport, are less prone to leaking toxic, corrosive vapor at the slightest provocation, and even the largest solid-fuel missiles can be launched on a few minutes’ notice. That last characteristic is going to be particularly important for North Korea, as South Korea’s missiles can reach targets anywhere in the North in the fifteen minutes or so it would take to fuel and ready a liquid-fuel missile for launch.
I wonder what advantages liquid-fuel launch systems have over solid-fuel, but that’s merely an idle question.
The test resulted in a reaction by the West:
The fact that the missile was not of longer range appeared to obviate the “red line” problem created by the president’s intemperate “won’t happen” tweet. And even more importantly, the test activated the hidden lineaments of the alliance, including a Trump statement of support for Japan (although not South Korea), a phone call between then-National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his South Korean counterpart, Kim Kwan-jin, and a joint call by the U.S., Japan and Korea to convene a Security Council meeting.
If that is the good news, the bad news is that the test is not just a diplomatic-political signal. It is rather another step in the development of the country’s missile capabilities, which have continually been underestimated.
I must admit to not being certain how lineaments is used, with this definition my best guess:
Usually, lineaments. distinguishing features; distinctive characteristics:
the lineaments of sincere repentance.
I have to wonder why South Korea didn’t receive a supportive phone call, unless it’s its ongoing political crisis makes it a dicey proposition. Regardless, North Korea – not a permanently fractured Islamic world which is perpetually chewing on itself and faced with a mildly hostile, nuclear-armed Indian nation on its flank – will, in my neophyte judgment – remain one of the most important challenges of the Trump Administration, and one of the most volatile, where the greatest gains or the greatest losses will be seen.
