The Nuclear Deal and Iran’s Election

Iran just ran their first election since the nuclear deal was signed.  It’s interesting to read the run up to the election – and see the (possibly justified) concerns about foreign conspiracies. For example, as reported by AL Monitor‘s Arash Karami, Supreme Leader Khamenei warning about the Americans and the British:

Khamenei said that in the last 37 years, since the 1979 revolution, Iran’s enemies, including US officials, have attempted to dissuade Iranians from voting by describing the election process in the country as being useless. Khamenei now believes, however, that the United States has learned from experience that taking a direct position against Iran’s elections has had the opposite of the desired effect, prompting Iranians to show up and vote.

“Based on this,” Khamenei said, “the Americans have been silent in these elections.” His comments made an interesting contrast to his Feb. 17 speech, in which he said that “British radio is giving the people of Tehran instructions to vote” for specific individuals. …

Khamenei also called some observers’ dismissal of US “infiltration” into Iran “unwarranted and unjustified.” He warned that sometimes an individual may be an agent of infiltration and repeat the statements of the enemy without realizing they are in the service of the enemy.

One such instance of repeating the statements of enemy countries and “adopting the enemy’s political discourse,” according to Khamenei, is rhetoric that divides Iranian camps into hard-liners and moderates. He said the implication of doing so is that hard-liners are people who are bound to the Islamic Revolution and the principles of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and moderates are people who will surrender and compromise with foreigners.

An anonymous AL Monitor article from Iran notes further suspicion concerning the backing of the moderates.  Their strategy includes the publication of a list of moderate candidates, a ticket if you will, and a response:

Amid the launch of the “No to these 5” (hard-liners on Jannati’s ticket) campaign on social media, prominent dissident Akbar Ganji and BBC Persian separately published articles that examined and analyzed this strategy to sideline hard-liners. Hard-liners were quick to seize on the latter as an opportunity to hit back at Rafsanjani, thereby undermining the “No to these 5” campaign.

Hard-liners subsequently started branding the “No to these 5” campaign — as well as Rafsanjani and leading members of his list — as “English” and directed by the BBC. In this vein, the hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz newspaper wrote, “The plans for preventing Ayatollah Jannati, Yazdi and Mesbah [Yazdi] from getting into the assembly are being managed by the BBC. The formulas of this British channel and its staff for not allowing these clerics to get into the assembly signal their long-term plans.” Vatan-e Emrooz added, “They are seeking to create a new makeup in the Assembly of Experts, one which gives Rafsanjani the upper hand.” Moreover, the hard-line daily published a picture of the five hard-line ayatollahs and deemed them “anti-British.” Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian military, has also harshly reacted to this controversy, saying, “If those who are being supported by Britain and the United States do not condemn these two countries’ meddling in Iran’s elections, they are considered [tried and] convicted.”

Khatami, the interim Tehran Friday prayer leader who is targeted by the campaign, has also spoken out. “British and foreign media outlets are asking our people not to vote for Jannati, Yazdi, Mesbah [Yazdi], Alamolhoda and I. This is none of your business; you nosy people should know that these five are the top choices of our people,” Khatami asserted, adding, “My sin is that I have given the seditionists a hard time during my Friday sermons.” One day later, Khatami stated, “I’m sure that their [Rafsanjani’s] list won’t be able to attract votes, as they are thought of as supporters of the sedition [unrest in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential election] and are as hated as the [former] shah.”

The fact this is anonymous blows a little cold for me.

Despite the veiled warnings, polling indicates the Iranians would prefer a moderate government, as noted in this AL Monitor article by Barbara Slavin:

Of those polled, 67% said they approved of Rouhani’s job performance, while only 18% gave him a negative rating. Despite the fact that the Iranian economy has not yet rebounded following the recent nuclear deal, Rouhani saw his favorable ratings go up by 13% from a previous poll last July.

The survey showed a wide variety of political sympathies but strongest support for Reformists among the choices on offer. Some 20% of respondents said they preferred the Reformist camp, while only 12% identified with a more hard-line faction known as the Principlists. Interestingly, 44% of those polled said they weren’t sure what group they liked and 11% expressed no preference at all.

And the results?  This BBC article’s title gives a subtle hint:

Iran election: Reformists win all 30 Tehran seats

Early results gave former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a moderate conservative, and Mr Rouhani the most votes for the assembly, which is composed of mostly elder and senior clerics.

This stunning election result will make a difference in Iran’s engagement with the wider world.

President Rouhani’s hand has been strengthened in parliament to help open his country to greater trade and investment. That will help him, and others in his reformist camp, to deepen the dialogue with the West, which began with negotiations on a landmark nuclear deal.

Vox‘s Max Fisher opines:

When nuclear negotiations got started, there was concern that Iranians would reject any deal as a humiliation, given that it would likely require surrendering most of the nuclear program and submitting to embarrassing inspections.

Rouhani got around this problem by promising that the deal would bring economic relief and an opening with the outside world, which would itself bring Iranians dignity and pride.

It worked. The election became a mechanism for demonstrating that Rouhani’s strategy is popular, for giving Rouhani’s allies more power to continue that strategy, and for weakening the hard-liners who opposed the nuclear deal.

This has been reflected in Western coverage of the elections. The New York Times’s Tehran-based Thomas Erdbrink, for example, wrote of the elections’ results, “The most reactionary voices in Iranian politics are losing ground to moderates buoyed by the sweeping nuclear deal with big powers, including the United States.”

But a bit of realism:

Hard-liners might be down in Iran’s elected bodies — they lost the presidency and lost their majority in parliament — but they still hold the powerful unelected bodies I mentioned earlier. They’re under growing political pressure to accommodate moderates, but they’re still very powerful themselves.

“Here is the rub,” [Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group’s senior Iran analyst] told me. “The moderates have more wind in their sails, but the overall balance of power remains unaltered. The moderates’ victory is above all symbolic. Rouhani still needs other power centers and the conservatives to advance his agenda.”

Will US Congressional leaders even take notice of the electoral result, or does Senator Cruz’s promise to “tear up” the nuclear deal still hold firm? Appraising Iran is a complex undertaking, and while I enjoy reading and learning about them, I’d hesitate to take any judgments on them. However, without a doubt any move towards a more moderate government is a positive sign, and the fact that the nuclear deal is seen as advancing that cause should rise quiet hopes of Iran becoming less and less a force for disaster in the Mid East.

Bookmark the permalink.

About Hue White

Former BBS operator; software engineer; cat lackey.

Comments are closed.