The “Little Boy” cloud.
Kevin Drum revisits an old post of his regarding research into why World War II ended, and usually I wouldn’t comment on an old post, even a revisited old post, but it concerns World War II, which is a pivot point in human history, and there’s one statement from journalist Gareth Cook, referencing historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa new (at the time) work, that Kevin treats that I think could stand a little more analysis. Here’s Drum:
This is fascinating stuff. At the same time, I think that Cook takes a step too far when he suggests that Hasegawa’s research, if true, should fundamentally change our view of atomic weapons. “If the atomic bomb alone could not compel the Japanese to submit,” he writes, “then perhaps the nuclear deterrent is not as strong as it seems.” But that hardly follows. America in 1945 had an air force capable of leveling cities with conventional weaponry. We still do—though barely—but no other country in the world comes close. With an atomic bomb and a delivery vehicle, North Korea can threaten to destroy Seoul. Without it, they can’t. And larger atomic states, like the US, India, Pakistan, and Russia, have the capacity to do more than just level a city or two. They can level entire countries.
It is fascinating, even though my understanding of World War II is out of date and informal. The implications of a Japanese High Command, faced with overwhelming force and superior, by then, technologies, that still was split on surrender even after losing two entire cities speaks to a certain brand of religious fanaticism of fascinating pathology.
But it’s the statement, “If the atomic bomb alone could not compel the Japanese to submit,” [Hasegawa] writes, “then perhaps the nuclear deterrent is not as strong as it seems.” This presumes humanity and its culture as a constant across time and space, and, to my eye, in neither dimension is humanity and culture constant. I see constant evolution and changes in values; indeed, such is necessary due to changes in environment and competition. Those cultures that do not change and adapt die.
So attempting to determine the strength of a nuclear deterrent for all of mankind is a fool’s quest, it’s a tilt against the windmill. The strength of a deterrent is societally determined. For example, what is the value of a human life? In the West, we presume it to be fairly high, but that’s not a universally accepted value. In badly overpopulated cities, the price of a life can be very low.
Another objection lies in the differing contexts. Japan was already at war, a war that had gone on for four years. Deterrent, though, implies a state other than a so-called ‘hot war’: the iconic Cold War between the West and the Soviet bloc, which never devolved into all out war, may not have transitioned to a real war because both sides had nuclear weapons, or such is the popular wisdom of the time.
So while my end conclusion may match Drum’s, it’s not at all for the same reasons. He relies on equivalent technologies and their effect on the enemy, while I prefer a more fundamental approach.
