Paul Rosenzweig on Lawfare is in agony over the breakage of integrity in the national security apparatus:
And it really, really is a problem that they have succeeded. In normal times—by which I mean the entire course of the American Republic, and certainly the time from 1945 until just a couple of years ago—the CIA’s conclusions about bin Salman would have been some of the most highly classified secrets within the American government, subject to dissemenation to a small, select group of individuals. The reasons for this secrecy are, classically, two-fold: First, disclosure of what we know deprives the country’s leaders of freedom of action, to act with knowledge that U.S. adversaries don’t know we have and to select courses of action that maximize America’s benefit. Second, disclosure of what the government knows will often “burn” sources and methods so that the inquiry is of the “one and done” variety. When U.S. opponents know what America knows, they often learn how America knows it—and change their behavior accordingly.
And so it is beyond belief that some in the CIA (or elsewhere in the classified community) feel the necessity to disclose this Top Secret information publicly through the Post. I understand their motivation—the aberrance of Donald Trump is so great that they have no faith in his ability or willingness to process intelligence analysis faithfully. I share their concern—in spades. But violating norms of behavior and the criminal law is not the way to ameliorate the problem.
One must wonder, though, if the leakers assessed the damage potential of making such a release and came to the conclusion that the Saudis would truly learn little, if anything, from it. Security professionals are not idiots, and are often intensely patriotic, outside of a few well-known exceptions. That patriotism may be the driving force in these leaks, once the incompetence and venality of Trump had become apparent.
But it’s a minefield in which they’re dancing, there’s no doubt about that.
