I noticed there are reports of protests in Iran on CNN, and, wondering what might be going on, I checked on AL Monitor, where Mohammad Ali Shabani is analyzing the possible causes. After noting official pronouncements and some eye-popping inflation numbers since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, he zeroes in on the probable real causes:
As such, inflation in itself is not likely to have ignited the protests in Iran. What should rather be considered is the element of thwarted expectations as a powerful and potentially motivating factor in the broader equation.
To reiterate, drastically reduced inflation and the return of economic growth under Rouhani have not yet translated into sufficient job creation. This has occurred in an environment where higher anticipations about the future are clashing with a reality in which the promised dividends of the nuclear deal — which while greatly strengthening state finances — have yet to trickle down to the average Iranian. If parliament passes the Rouhani administration’s proposed budget bill for the Iranian year beginning March 21, 2018, citizens will not only face the prospect of higher fuel costs but also potentially being cut off from monthly cash subsidy payments.
Despite these serious conundrums, both revolutionary theory and the Iranian experience show that although low living standards are a constant preoccupation, they are not a constant threat. Neither should socio-economic discontent be equated with effective political resistance. Without necessary resources to maintain autonomous collective organization(s) and form popular opposition that is channeled into effective political action, change remains a remote prospect. This is not to mention the absence of a forward-looking ideology that is understandable to the wider population, capable of providing a powerful alternative vision of societal order and narrative of state identity.
Not unlike some of the problems in the United States, where despite an excellent nation-wide unemployment rate of 4.1%, there are geographic areas and demographic groups which are experiencing much higher unemployment rates.
But I also found interesting this subtlety, no doubt familiar to professional Iran observers, but of course new to me:
Iranian authorities have stated that the protests were organized via the popular smartphone app Telegram, pointing the finger at “counter-revolutionaries.” Meanwhile, the administration of President Hassan Rouhani believes that its conservative foes are the culprits behind the unrest.
Note how “authorities” are differentiated from the administration of Rouhani, and how they come to different conclusions. It really suggests there’s the permanent, theocratic power structure in Iran, and then the democratic part, limited to those who pass the theological tests imposed by the permanent structure, that has some of the responsibilities of government, but not all. The first, of course, like any permanent human institution, is susceptible to normal human corruptive forces of desire for wealth, power, or even malignant theological interpretations.
And, given the split in power, mutual jealousies, as illustrated by the differing interpretations of the motivations of the protesters.
