More than a year ago the SDFLA blog (dedicated to the affairs of the Federal District of South Florida) had a piece on a juror who didn’t rely on their own judgment when it came time for deliberations – they asked the Divine and accepted its guidance.
The juror was dismissed, the defendant convicted, and one of the judges is unhappy:
Judge William Pryor dissents and says the conviction should be reversed:
Do each of you solemnly swear that you will well and truly try the case now before this court and render a true verdict, according to the law, evidence, and instructions of this court, so help you God?
Every juror who was empaneled in Corrine Brown’s criminal trial swore this oath. One of them was dismissed because he apparently meant it. By approving his dismissal, the majority erodes the “tough legal standard” governing the removal of deliberating jurors and imperils the sanctity of the right to trial by jury. United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring that juror misconduct be proven “beyond reasonable doubt” before dismissing a deliberating juror). And it does so in an especially troubling manner: after admitting that “one reasonable construction” of the record supports the view that this juror rendered proper service, it holds that the district court’s adverse reaction to the way this juror talked about God nevertheless proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the juror engaged in misconduct. Majority Op. at 29–31 (emphasis added). …
… the suspect juror confirmed that, near the start of deliberations, he had said something to the effect of “the Holy Spirit told me that Corrine Brown was not guilty on all charges.”
There’s more, but it’s at some length and is a little involved, so I won’t quote it here.
But I don’t think Judge Pryor is at all convincing. It’s not so much the arguments he employs, which attempt to mitigate the statements of the juror, as it is his evasion of the philosophy behind using a jury.
Juries are an implicit acknowledgment that, at the best of times, reality can be a difficult thing to comprehend; in a possibly criminal situation, the judgments of some number of jurors, ideally unprejudiced as to the facts of the case, while informed as to the law thought to be applicable, are thought necessary to permit a reasonable chance at achieving justice, and escape the corruption of the highest and the passions of the mob.
This juror, who said they were relying on the “Holy Spirit,” has, in my opinion, betrayed their oath to apply best judgment as to the facts and the law of the case. Rather than use the public knowledge applicable to the case, also known as the facts as presented by the prosecution and, optionally, contested by the defense, to find a verdict, this juror has relied on private knowledge. This is the intuition of unknowable reliability possibly delivered by a supernatural entity, or more likely of a less exalted source, ranging from random neurons firing to concealed inclinations to, perhaps, another supernatural entity of less favorable mien ensorceling the person.
The difference between public and private knowledge is pivotal. In the face of a tangible world of uncertain origin and a supposed spiritual world which delivers nothing in the way of objective evidence, much less messages, the search of justice is enhanced by human jurors who, by the employ of their rational faculties, attempt to make sense and apply justice to situations of sometimes uncertain nature.
To disagree with the dismissal of a juror who has abandoned their rational faculties is to abandon the entire enterprise of rational inquiry.
The dismissal of our Divine-bound juror is justified.
