The situation involving an Ethiopian dam on the Nile does not appear to have improved, according to an AL Monitor report:
Antony Blinken, US President Joe Biden’s nominee to be secretary of state, warned this week in his confirmation hearing that talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam could “boil over.”
In response to a question by Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chris Coons, D-Del., about how the United States can better support the “fragile transition in Sudan” and hold countries in the region accountable for human rights, Blinken noted “concerning actions, including atrocities” by Ethiopian forces against Tigreans and refugees and promised a “fully engaged” American foreign policy in the region. …
The stakes in the Nile dam talks couldn’t be higher for Egypt, and became more complicated, and intertwined, because of the Ethiopian civil war and its impact on Sudan. While the Nile talks have been until now been mostly a high stakes Egypt-Ethiopia diplomatic dispute, with Sudan in a supporting role (for Egypt), the Sudan-Ethiopia fault line now risks military escalation.
There’s not a lot more to say than what’s come before on this thread, is there? A military strike on Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam could light quite a fire if other military and diplomatic powers, such as the United States, aren’t ready to quench it immediately. Still …
The Biden administration has a strong diplomatic hand. The United States has close ties with all three parties to the Nile talks. If managed right, there is plenty of Nile water to share, and no one is talking about infringing on Ethiopia’s ultimate sovereignty over the Blue Nile dam. Egypt, to its credit, has so far played the Nile talks by the diplomatic book.
The United Arab Emirates, which has long-standing interests and relationships in the region, could offer an assist, even if quietly, as Ahmed Gomaa reports. Abu Dhabi’s position has been to consistently back diplomacy and de-escalation, and it has good relations with all parties. As Knopf and Feltman point out, the Ethiopian crisis, and its consequences, represent a shared interest with the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as African allies and partners.
I wish I understood the basis on which the authors of this piece assert If managed right, there is plenty of Nile water to share, because that would be a source of hope. And if there’s not?
Egypt has a population in the range of 100 million, Ethiopia’s in the same neighborhood, and Sudan is at 41 million. It’s not a peaceful part of Africa, so a war could be likely and quite deadly. But if there are enough outside parties pressing for harmony, perhaps the controversy can be settled. Peace be on them.
