Which is curiously polite and even passive-aggressive. It has to do with the government’s attempt to abandon the prosecution of former National Security Advisor Flynn now that he’s plead guilty twice to lying to the FBI, as retired Judge Gleeson, asked to investigate whether the government should be permitted to drop those charges, doesn’t agree they should:
First, “the requirement of judicial approval entitles the judge to obtain and evaluate the prosecutor’s reasons.” United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Here, the Government’s statement of reasons for seeking dismissal is pretextual. The Government claims there is insufficient evidence to prove materiality and falsity, but even giving it the benefit of every doubt—and recognizing its prerogative to assess the strength of its own case—this contention “taxes the credulity of the credulous.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Government’s ostensible grounds for seeking dismissal are conclusively disproven by its own briefs filed earlier in this very proceeding. They contradict and ignore this Court’s prior orders, which constitute law of the case. They are riddled with inexplicable and elementary errors of law and fact. And they depart from positions that the Government has taken in other cases. While Rule 48(a) does not require the Government to bare its innermost secrets, it does require a statement of its reasons for dismissal. See Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620 (explaining that this requirement “prevent[s] abuse of the uncontrolled power of dismissal previously enjoyed by prosecutors”). Leave of court should not be granted when the explanations the Government puts forth are not credible as the real reasons for its dismissal of a criminal charge.
Second, the Court should deny leave because there is clear evidence of a gross abuse of prosecutorial power. Rule 48(a) was designed to “guard against dubious dismissals of criminal cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants.” In other words, the rule empowers courts to protect the integrity of their own proceedings from prosecutors who undertake corrupt, politically motivated dismissals. See id.; see also Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620-622. That is what has happened here. The Government has engaged in highly irregular conduct to benefit a political ally of the President. The facts of this case overcome the presumption of regularity. The Court should therefore deny the Government’s motion to dismiss, adjudicate any remaining motions, and then sentence the Defendant.
It’s full of politely intellectual slaps of the face. I wonder if AG Barr even realizes how much he’s been insulted by Gleeson’s evaluation of Barr’s order to drop the prosecution of a man that Judge Sullivan claimed was close to treason.
He basically called Barr a criminal to his face.
