Have you ever wondered about assessments of China’s approach to war? If so, this article by Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro on Lawfare might be of interest:
I found Beijing had three tendencies that hindered timely war resolution. First, in terms of wartime diplomacy, China was willing to open communication channels in the initial stages of conflict only with weaker parties. Otherwise, China cut off communications and delayed talking until it had demonstrated sufficient toughness through fighting. This, in turn, can result in a longer war than necessary. The second tendency concerns China’s approach to escalation—China consistently exhibited confidence, especially in the initial stages, that heavy escalation would ensure a short conflict that ended on China’s terms. This discourages Chinese leaders from considering de-escalation strategies, which may result in wars fought at a higher level of violence than would be the case otherwise. Last, with respect to mediation, China did approach third parties, which theoretically could have been beneficial. However, because China specifically involved them to pressure the adversary on China’s behalf and not to act as genuine mediators, the Chinese internationalization of disputes did not lead to swift resolution. Given that outside intervention is most effective when all parties are seriously committed to mediation, this trend to leverage third parties only to pressure China’s enemies is potentially problematic In short, China’s approach to diplomacy, escalation, and mediation created obstacles to conflict resolution.
However, China is not the same country it was when it fought its previous wars. There are three specific changes that may change Chinese war termination behavior. First, the Chinese military is significantly more capable with respect to other regional actors, which could plausibly affect its diplomatic posture. Second, the Party has less control over domestic public opinion in potential conflicts than it did in the Mao and Deng eras, which could plausibly affect its willingness to escalate conflicts. And third, China is now more economically and politically integrated into the international order, which could plausibly affect its approach to third-party involvement. I conducted a closer look at these changes in a recent article and found these three changes are likely to magnify rather than dampen China’s problematic war termination tendencies.
Assessments of this sort can never be made out of context, and with the assumption of the Presidency by Donald Trump, the context has changed. I suspect we’ve been seeing more aggression out of China purely to test President Trump, and since they continue to be quite aggressive, I think they’ve found someone who they can push around. Steve Benen summed up Trump’s behavior with respect to China today:
Worse, the larger pattern puts the White House in an especially unflattering light. Trump, eager to appear “tough,” said after his election that he was prepared to walk away from our “One China” policy. Chinese officials weren’t pleased, and Trump quickly backed down.
The American president also vowed to label China a currency manipulator, right before he retreatedon this, too.
The Trump administration was cracking down on ZTE after it did business with Iran and North Korea, lied about it, and created a domestic security threat. After stating his concerns for Chinese jobs, Trump backed down on this, too.
I wonder just how much we have to lose with incompetency in charge.
