This morning’s headlines are reporting that President Trump has agreed to meet with North Korea’s despot, Kim Jong-un. A couple of days ago Ruediger Frank on 38 North discussed the beginning of Cold War 2.0:
The whole idea of a dead end situation depends on the assumption that consent and cooperation by Washington is an essential part of everybody’s calculations. So far, this is certainly true, but the world is turning. China has been rising for many years now. As result of its massive gains in economic, military and political power, Beijing is becoming more assertive in international politics. The South China Sea conflict, the Belt and Road Initiative, and even the recent constitutional change to extend the rule of Xi Jinping are indicators of that. I have for a long time expected a situation when the Chinese are ready for an open challenge to the supremacy of the United States, thus ending the phase of a unipolar world order that started with the demise of the Soviet Union around 1990. I call it the Cold War 2.0, and it will certainly start in China’s own backyard: East Asia. I thought such a development would take at least ten more years to materialize, however. Is this what we are witnessing now, thanks in part to Donald Trump who is acting as a catalyst of such a process by pulling the plug on TPP, expanding THAAD, demanding higher payment for US military presence, and offending his allies with the threat of punitive trade measures? We should keep our eyes open for signs from Beijing.
If this is where the game is headed, Chinese influence could play a critical role in changing the outcome of inter-Korean dialogue. For instance, imagine a scenario where Beijing is trying to capitalize on the current momentum and is ready to stand up to the United States, rather than continuing cooperation in a maximum pressure approach. In that case, it could declare after the upcoming April summit that the current inter-Korean dialogue has created important results, and that these show the international sanctions, at least those to which China has agreed, have fulfilled their task and have now become unnecessary. North Korea would be displayed by the Chinese as a country that is still problematic, but one that has shown willingness to cooperate and thus needs to be rewarded for such positive behavior in the name of peace and prosperity. Beijing could, for instance, submit a resolution to the UN Security Council to lift some of the sanctions, especially those targeting commercial sectors. Such a step would be vetoed by the US and most likely also by the UK and France. China may then declare that it no longer feels bound by previous resolutions and would unilaterally open its markets again for North Korean goods and services, and host those who want to engage in trade and financial transactions with that country. Russia would likely follow suit.
Under such circumstances, South Korea would then have a choice: It could side with the United States and the UNSC, and refrain from re-opening the Kaesong Industrial Zone, resuming trade and other forms of economic exchange. Alternatively, however, Seoul could share Beijing’s position and feel free to do whatever they see is in the national interest of Korea.
In this era of weakening alliances, I could easily see Trump’s alienation of the South Koreans last year, in tandem with the North Korean offer to discuss the future with South Korea, resulting in a realignment. Frank may disagree:
Or this might just be the beginning of the end of the post-1990 world order. If true, this would require a complete rethinking of what we regarded as certainties, including such big issues as the US presence on the Korean peninsula, the status of Taiwan, and in a more distant future, the possible prospect of a Korean unification with Chinese backing. What the US does next will have long-term implications for the role it will play in Asia’s future. To maintain influence, the US should be smart, capture the current process and take a more active stake in dialogue with North Korea, rather than being the only party to remain seated ostentatiously while everybody else is cheering the joint North-South team.
Whatever else you may think of Kim, think of this: he’s been trained for his role as government leader. So far he and his family has displayed long-term thinking skills, where long-term means, at least, decades. So have the Chinese. President Trump? I doubt more than a year – and then it’s all business, with no thoughts to the international political aspects. He has neither the training, family tradition, or intellectual curiosity to be up to speed when it comes to planning for the future of this country in the international arena.
So when Trump meets with Kim, what are the dangers? That the United States gets taken for a ride. Kim will have focused on Trump as his primary antagonist, the man he must best in diplomatic maneuvering. Claiming nuclear weapons, he now will appear to be dealing from a position of strength. It may even appear that he’s summoned the American president to the meeting.
The hardest part will be discerning how we’ve been taken. If Kim is good, he’ll make it appear that some sort of equitable deal has been struck that enshrines his family as the leaders of North Korea, but there’ll be more to it that President Trump will not understand.
And the most dangerous part will be the claims by the incompetent President of political salvation. Remember, he’s focused on biggest and best. He wants to eclipse his predecessors, most notably Obama, in his accomplishments, and spends inordinate amounts of time claiming that he’s done so – all bombast, exaggerations, and outright lies. But this will something of substance, now won’t it? Especially after last year’s verbal fireworks, it’ll look like Trump has actually accomplished something worthwhile.
And sticking us with Trump for the balance of his term – and possibly even the next – would be a masterstroke by Kim. Crippled by trade wars, losing influence so fast you can see the needle dropping, this is Kim’s dream scenario.
