Georgy Toloraya on 38 North attempts to discern the most important information in any adversarial relationship – what does the North Korea leadership want?
In recent discussions, North Koreans reiterated Pyongyang’s standard policy goals: reach “strategic parity” with the US by creating a credible nuclear deterrent and compelling opponents to conclude a peace treaty with the North, recognize the sovereignty and independence of the DPRK, and provide security guarantees to enable the country’s further economic development. The North Koreans with whom I spoke with argued that without a “nuclear deterrent,” the hostility of the US and many of its allies toward North Korea will sooner or later result in “crushing down” the country. However, they did nothing to dispel the suspicion that, in fact, Pyongyang might also aim at aggression and concessions extortion from South Korea if it gets a deterrent against the US.
It is my impression that policymakers in Pyongyang believe the only purpose of US policy is to liquidate the DPRK as a state or even “physically destroy” the country and its leadership. The regime does not believe that removal of North Korean nuclear weapons per se is very significant to the US, and rather sees this demand as an attempt to undermine the country’s deterrence and gain advantage for a military solution of the Korean issue or regime change by other means.
It was clear from my discussions with the North Koreans that internal debates over the country’s nuclear doctrine have not yet been settled and there is no clear picture of what a nuclear war-fighting doctrine would look like. Nor did they seem to understand that having an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability only gives rise to suspicions that the North wishes to unify Korea by force while using its nuclear capability to protect it from US interference (a common theory among South Koreans and Americans). Going forward, a declaration that North Korea does not have these intentions and a codification of this pledge in official documents might be essential along with an explanation of the country’s nuclear doctrine, which seems to have evolved considerably during the last couple of years. But these ideas, from what I heard, have not been considered by the regime.
Reports on the status of the North Korean populace are mixed – and, of course. sources must always be appraised. For example, that North Korean soldier who defected a couple of months ago was reported to be plagued with parasites, which was interpreted to indicate that the food supply in North Korea is bad. But what if this is a false report? It would be classic propaganda by our own side, meant to manipulate popular opinion.
But how do we know?
In the end, American officials may have to decide if it’s better to try to break the regime through sanctions, or assist the regime through various peaceful means, such as food shipments. In the former case, Americans may be held responsible for the deaths of thousands – yet the latter can be considered assisting an enemy.
This is a subtle conundrum, one for which the current American administration is very ill-suited.
