On Lawfare Daniel Byman provides a primer on the fissures in global jihad. Will we be seeing more caliphates in the future?
Questions of tatarrus or the precise line where apostasy begins and ends mean little to most foot soldiers. Data from captured Islamic State records showed that 70 percent of recruits claimed they had only a basic knowledge of Islam. But some of these questions have a tremendous impact on the appeal of different groups. The revival of the caliphate, for example, proved compelling to many recruits and, regardless of its perceived legitimacy among purists, the temptation to play this popular card will be there in the future.
It’s always tempting to urge the United States to try to play up these divisions, and I’ve done so myself at times. The U.S. track record of influencing the jihadist dialogue, however, ranges from poor to nonexistent, and deliberately trying to generate ever more extreme factions isn’t wise. But these internal fissures do hamper U.S. enemies and do some of the work for us. At the very least, they expend precious time and energy trying to one-up rival groups in their propaganda. At most, the differences lead to actual shots fired or recruits and donors being turned off by infighting.
These endless differences between the various sects of Islam that Daniel notes in the article has always indicated to me that there is always a necessary vigilance concerning the extremists with grievances, real or imagined, against the West, but there’s little to fear in terms of a united Islam crusading against the West. Between the usual burdens of the religious in general and the general loathing they have for each other, a united command appears to be out of the picture.
For that reason there’s little point in allowing ourselves to be distracted from other, more potent opponents, such as Russia, even in its current bedraggled state, North Korea, and what appears to be a highly rational China.
