On Lawfare Jane Chong, Quinta Jurecic, and Benjamin Wittes lay out the known facts about the Russian intervention in the American Presidential election and then construct seven theories which are consistent with the facts. I like #3:
Theory of the Case #3: The Russian Operation Wasn’t Really About Trump at All
Before turning to more menacing possibilities, let’s pause to consider a theory somewhat orthogonal to the axis of ascending menace along which we have arrayed these theories: Perhaps the true explanation of the Trump-Russia connection is that the Russian operation wasn’t really about Trump at all—but was really about Hillary Clinton.
There’s reason to believe that the Russian objective here was not specifically to get Trump elected President; like the rest of the world, the Russians seem to have believed that Clinton was going to win. The goal may well have been to injure her legitimacy and popularity as much as possible, weaken her domestic legitimacy, and retaliate against her perceived interference in Russian internal affairs when she, as Secretary of State, supported anti-Putin protesters. In this scenario, Russian support for Trump was largely ancillary to this effort to hurt Clinton.
There is some public evidence to support this theory. Earlier this month, Reuters reported on two strategy documents prepared by Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, the Kremlin’s primary foreign policy think tank, one of which emphasized Clinton’s likely win and argued Russia should shift from pro-Trump propaganda to messaging designed to undermine the legitimacy of her predicted electoral victory and ensuing presidency.
It’s attractive because I don’t see the Russians comfortable with Trump’s erratic behavior – but I do see them disliking the Clinton opposition to their plans. She had the experience, training, and outlook to recognize threats and do something about them. Trump? He’s a real-estate developer with a mouth and not much brains.
