It’s a long movie, but it’s a darn good movie: The Missiles of October (1974) gives a history of the move / counter-move of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Make no mistake – this is not the Star Wars (1977) of the Cold War, full of explosions and frankly evil characters. This is a movie overwhelmingly about meetings – meetings which decide the fate of the world.
The genius of this movie is its implicit invitation to the viewer to test their decisions against that of the President and his advisors. So you’re a cowboy and would have taken out the missile sites as soon as they were identified, stuck your chest out and taken the return fire with aplomb, would you? In a scene in which Congressional leadership is informed of the situation, one Senator says just that, and is rewarded by a harsh riposte from President Kennedy – “Within the first 30 seconds your entire constituency would be killed, Senator!” Because we discover that our military refuses to guarantee a kill ratio of 100% of those missile sites, implying a return fire of several nuclear warheads. And the movie invites many more such tests of the opinionated man’s decisions – and why they are so often wrong when taken from without. For the sober viewer, it’s a lesson in incomplete information, and in more ways than one, as we watch JFK fret over his information, always requesting better information.
There is a stark historicity to this movie, driven by top-flight performances by the actors, as well as its lack of musical accompaniment. This lack of a clue forces the audience to pay attention to the dialog, the hints at motivation, the suggestions that neither side is without fault in this confrontation, as the Bay of Pigs debacle bears passing reference (I wish there’d been more on this incident), while Soviet dissembling regarding the nature and purpose of the missiles is also brought up.
And during this we also see the Administration frantically covering up for tactical reasons – not out of embarrassment, although there’s a fair amount of that, but in order to surprise the Soviets at their own game. International relations are not always a public game, a lesson most of America still does not understand.
As an added bonus, it’s difficult not to compare and contrast with the Trump Administration. It truly makes me ill comparing the painstaking search for the best alternative to all out war by JFK, vs Trump probably waving it all off after half an hour and commanding a general to just shoot the crap out of Havana.
And then blaming it on reading a newspaper.
And I don’t write that out of gratuitous bitterness, but because this script doesn’t scant on the real frustrations and conflicts the characters run into. JFK loathes the idea of being the next war-chief Tojo, who planned the Japanese entry into World War II, which he mentions enough that Dean Acheson, who has a profoundly differing opinion on response, finally brings up as he knows JFK worries about it, to which JFK replies, I know you know. There is a depth to the political passions that is only hinted at, a theory of mind which gives much depth to this movie.
There’s also the unsettling reminder that the inhabitants of Congress are often simple creatures. JFK angrily quips, You get them together and they follow the one with the biggest bomb. (Possibly a paraphrase.) It’s a ghastly allusion to the problems of having a leadership made of amateurs who often have no training, with little conception of the nuances of international relations. As that’s an accurate description of the current occupant of the White House, this movie brings some real insight into what sort of damage we may be suffering silently while he fiddle faddles around. Given his predilection for watching Fox News, perhaps they should show this movie for his edification.
ALL that said, there is of course the lingering question of accuracy. The meetings portrayed were secretly recorded, as noted here; were the recordings available to the playwright/screenwriter, Stanley R. Greenberg? I haven’t found any material on the topic, although social scientists note there seems to be a lack of “groupthink” – and this was definitely a group that often conflicted with each other. The source for the material used to portray the Soviet meetings is even less clear.
Nor was my Arts Editor pleased at the lack of substantive female characters.
In sum, if you can get your jollies from seeing how the end of the world can be averted through meetings, diplomacy, and some very finely applied power, then this is for you. It was certainly for me – the edge of my seat was a little worn.
Strongly Recommended.
