A long time nemesis of Israel and the United States has bowed out of the Iranian presidential election at the order of Supreme Leader Khamenei, according to Misha Zand in AL Monitor:
On Sept. 27, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent an official letter to the supreme leader of Iran announcing that he will not run as a candidate in the May 19 presidential election.
In his letter, Ahmadinejad referred to an Aug. 30 meeting with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and wrote: “You recommended that it is not suitable at this time for me to participate in the elections. Therefore, I have declared my obedience. … I have no plans to compete in next year’s election.”
I would have classed him as a hardliner, so this is interesting:
In addition to the media outlets directly linked to Ahmadinejad, a rare unified wave of voices from the Reformist camp and hard-liners dominated the opinion sections and the front pages welcoming Khamenei’s Sept. 26 remarks.
From the context, the remarks might appear unified, but the motivations vary. The Reformists simply didn’t like him or his policy, but the hard liners, for some reason, wanted Khamenei’s remarks to be published before they’d accept that the former President would not be running.
I wonder who Khamenei will favor in that race. I doubt it’d be current President Rouhani, a Reformist.
The Arutz Sheva of Israel elaborates slightly:
Prior to leaving the presidency, Ahmadinejad said he prided himself on his denial of the Holocaust.
Rouhani’s popularity surged after last year’s deal with world powers that lifted most sanctions on Iran in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program.
Another potential rival, Revolutionary Guard Commander Qassem Soleimani, said this month he would not stand in the vote, according to Reuters.
Are they really unacceptable to Khamenei, or is the field being constricted to give his favorite, whoever that might be, a better chance? The Tehran Times covers the announcement, using some slightly more interesting language:
Ahmadinejad’s tenure was peppered with controversial events and subjective law enforcements, causing distress both nationally and internationally.
During the period, the Iranian economy was grounded by unprecedented inflation rates, 40 percent by one account, considering deteriorating relations with the outside world.
The Ahmadinejad administration, inter alia, cut a state subsidy system not exactly the same way stipulated by law whose negative consequences are still with millions of the people.
In addition to a domestic populist policy, he pursued an imbalanced foreign policy, as well, particularly with European countries who were hostile to Iran’s nuclear program.
