CNN is reporting the announcement by Democratic Sen. Barbara Mikulski of Maryland that she supports the Iran deal means a Presidential veto of legislation rejecting the deal can be sustained:
While majorities of both the GOP-controlled House and Senate are poised to vote against the agreement, supporters of the multinational accord that aims to curb Iran’s nuclear weapons program are also hoping to get the 41 votes needed to filibuster the bill and prevent it from even getting to a final vote in the Senate.
Secretary of State John Kerry said the administration will continue to try and push support for the deal past the 34 votes they now have “until the last moment.”
I wonder if they’re now hoping some Republican members of Congress will decide to sign on to this possibly historic agreement, rather than end up on the wrong side for pure partisan politics.
Meanwhile, the Saudis, having reluctantly decided to accept the agreement as a done deal, are preparing to make the best of it, according to Julian Pecquet at AL Monitor:
King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud’s three-day visit, strategically scheduled just days before Congress votes on the agreement, offers the Saudi leader a powerful platform to insist that the United States help combat Iranian “mischief.” The king is seeking assurances in the fight against Iran’s proxies across the region, as well as with elements of the nuclear deal itself. …
“The agreement must include a specific, strict and sustainable inspection regime of all Iranian sites, including military sites, as well as a mechanism to swiftly re-impose effective sanctions in the event that Iran violates the agreement,” the Saudi Embassy in Washington said after the deal was announced.
Most of the discussion is expected to center on non-nuclear issues, however.
Salman and President Barack Obama, who will meet Sept. 4 at the White House, are expected to further flesh out Washington’s promise of increased military support for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries — including a potential missile defense shield — as discussed during the US-GCC Camp David summit in May. That meeting, which was skipped by four of the top six regional leaders — including Salman — aimed to reassure the Gulf nations of America’s commitment to their security amid the perceived rapprochement with Iran. …
Much of the conversation is expected to focus on military hardware: The Saudis are seeking upgrades to their F-15s along with other advanced weaponry, but Israel is said to have raised concerns during Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s recent visit to the region. Congress may object to such sales if lawmakers deem that they would undermine Israel’s so-called qualitative military edge.
An upgraded military capability cannot make Israel happy. Perhaps a recognition of Israel’s right to exist and diplomatic ties might be part of the price for a better military? Excuse me while I indulge in a bit of schadenfreude at the GOP’s expense … the eye bulging would be priceless; but I fear neither Obama nor Secretary of State Kerry is that much of a magician.
Oman is pleased with itself, according to The Maghreb and Orient Courier:
The sultanate’s role in the “historic” agreement signed between great powers (P5+1) and Tehran is possibly the crowning achievement in Oman’s diplomatic record thus far, and grows its reputation as a state that can help resolve the region’s thorniest issues. Omanis are justifiably proud of their government’s successes on the international stage. Newspapers in Muscat carried the headlines: “Oman’s crucial role in Iran deal hailed by US”, “Iran praises Oman’s role in landmark nuclear deal”, and “Oman hopes Iran deal will lead to peace, stability.” But does this deal really improve Oman’s and the region’s security and stability? …
For Oman there is a lot at stake in their efforts to balance regional rivalries. The country’s long term strategy hinges on converting its oil exporting economy into a fully diversified hub of trade, tourism and logistics at the core of the Indian Ocean-Gulf littoral. The success of this plan will depend on whether it can continue to straddle the increasing perilous ground between Saudi-led Arab states, and Iran and its regional allies. The growing polarization in the region is causing many in the Gulf States to begin accusing Oman of siding with the Iranian ‘enemy’. It seems that a George W. Bush-like ‘you’re either with us or against us’ mentality is growing, which makes holding the middle ground increasingly difficult. On the plus side, Oman’s economic and security relations with the West remain exceptionally strong – particularly the US and the UK. But while Oman has consolidated its already good relations with Iran – plans for a trans-Gulf ferry service were quickly pushed forward since the landmark nuclear deal – more work is required to convince its GCC partners of its good intentions and the reasoning behind its neutral stances.
Foreign Policy Journal also gives a bit of history on Oman’s role.
Kuwait appears to be unhappy, according to this report in Middle East Briefing:
The US strategy towards Iran prior to the nuclear deal was that of containment. No one tells us now what will replace this strategy. We only hear this barrage of simplification and flat arguments defending the deal and accusing its critics of war mongering and repeated parroting from the deal supporters of the “blockbuster” question: What is the alternative?
Fine. Time now to ask: What is the alternative to the containment policy with Iran? The expected answer in the current politicized debate is: We are placing Iran in the watch list. There are many problems with this answer. First, Iran exists in a region that has a very rapid crisis tempo. Iran is not Gabon or Liberia. This tempo requires swift responses and clearer categorization. Second, being in the so-called “watch list” is not a strategy. It is the polished name of lacking one. Third, for are all the cheap shots directed towards the critics of the nuclear deal, no official effort to explain the position of the new relations with Iran within a clear regional strategy was ever provided.
They also claim to have foiled an instance of Iranian-backed terrorism:
It appeared as well that the ring was well organized and financed. The sources of finance were Hezbollah, the IRGC and local economic activities (particularly currency exchange and construction businesses owned by members). The targets were designated, researched, photographed, and some dry runs were done. A group of sympathizers and facilitators were organized, some of them in high and sensitive positions. …
Internationally, arresting the terrorist ring comes as a huge embarrassment to Iran just on the heel of signing the nuclear deal. The ring raises doubts about the authenticity of Tehran commitment to fight terrorism or to improve its ties with the GCC. Who can guarantee now that Tehran will not use terrorism internationally as it used to?
A similar claim comes from Saudi Arabia, as reported by AL Monitor:
Intelligence officials were waiting for Ahmed Ibrahim al-Mughassil, the man authorities blame for the 1996 bombing of US military barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, near the Dhahran air base. The blast killed 19 US Air Force personnel and wounded 372. Mughassil is said to be the head of Saudi Hezbollah, also called Hezbollah al-Hejaz, a group that Saudi authorities accuse of being an Iranian arm in the country. …
“Mughassil’s arrest is a major under-the-belt hit by the Saudis to Iran; now we are waiting to see the response, if there will be any.”
The Iran deal doesn’t signal the end of aggressive moves on either side. Speaking of persistence, the GOP is now asking the individual States to implement sanctions and otherwise interfere with commerce with Iran, as reported by AL Monitor:
With hawkish Democrats Bob Casey and Chris Coons all but ensuring opponents won’t have a veto-proof majority in the US Senate, the states are coming under pressure to pass their own sanctions. The Republican attorneys general of Oklahoma and Michigan, Scott Pruitt and Bill Schuette, wrote a letter to their counterparts Sept. 1 urging them to do just that.
“The states certainly have numerous moral and reputational reasons to prohibit investment of public assets into companies doing business with Iran and other countries that sponsor terrorism,” they wrote. “Even if it is true that Iran has relinquished its ambitions for a nuclear weapon and that its deal with President [Barack] Obama will prevent such an acquisition — both of which are highly questionable — Iran engages in a range of other reprehensible activities.”
The letter was accompanied by proposed draft legislation that the states that haven’t yet passed such sanctions are invited to use as a template. States have two main avenues for sanctioning Iran: restricting investments by state retirement plans, and barring state agencies from buying goods and services from blacklisted individuals and entities.
Whether this is infringing on Federal privileges with regard to foreign relations is not entire clear.
