In “Critical Cartography” on berfrois, Rhiannon Firth makes a strong case for maps having a moral component, in contrast to my views on moral components and man-made objects:
A critical cartography is the idea that maps – like other texts such as the written word, images or film – are not (and cannot be) value-free or neutral. Maps reflect and perpetuate relations of power, more often than not in the interests of dominant groups.
It is fairly easy to think of some ways in which maps embody power relations. One need not dig too deep within the history of mapping to see that they are intricately tied up in the history of nineteenth century colonialism and imperialism. Cartographers drew – and continue to draw – boundaries that separate people and resources. As another example, it is a fairly well-known fact that the commonly used Mercator projection of the globe is an inaccurate representation, because when cartographers ‘flatten out’ the spherical earth, they need to make certain choices: Size, shape and distances cannot all be maintained in the process. In the Mercator projection, the global North is vastly expanded at the expense of the South and Europe is placed squarely in the centre. As a further example, we may find it relatively easier – using an Ordinance Survey or Google Maps – to find a recently built supermarket than a longstanding squat, autonomous space, social centre or other radical space, or perhaps the site of the Battle of Hastings rather than the site of a historical radical struggle or riot. This does not just have practical implications for finding a space. Maps structure and limit our knowledge of the landscape, affecting our perception of what is important, the relative sizes and relationships between objects and spaces and where it is possible or safe to travel.
So I’ve been mulling this over. I still don’t see how a bolt is a moral object. A map is a different thing, if you permit it a tangible reality, which I think is inevitable; while digital maps may be more common, maps in physical media used to be dominant. I am less than an amateur philosopher, which is to say I’ve not read formal philosophy in a decade or so. I suspect we could place maps and bolts in different categories, but I don’t see the critical component of their existence; I tried to argue that a map is the result of a human intelligence, but the counter argument is too obvious.
Perhaps it’s more fruitful to change the argument from human intelligence to an expression of human opinion. This is more interesting; while one may argue that a bolt is also the expression of human opinion, there is a critical difference. Intelligence is a dubious term, as definitions for it differ from year to year. Opinion is somewhat more definite:
a belief or judgment that rests on grounds insufficient to produce complete certainty.
I would add, an opinion need not conform to reality, nor even the true views of the expressing entity. So let’s apply this to a map: the map may still prove useful, particularly if its false opinions do not lessen the efficacy of its purported purpose. So if certain information is omitted, as Rhiannon suggests happens with great frequency, then the map is deficient in that knowledge vector, but if the map’s purported purpose is in another knowledge vector, then the map remains useful even as it obscures certain information which may prove important in other contexts.
But if a false opinion is expressed in the production of a bolt, it’s such a definite, single purpose object that it would definitely fail in its purpose. So I’d have to say that the more an object may embody false opinions without damaging its fulfillment of a purpose, the more of a moral component may be said to be embodied in it.
So … tilting at minutiae? Hard to say. I also would like to say that I simply enjoyed Rhiannon’s piece. In fact, this is why I blog – I run across something that makes me think, that reveals a new angle on something. And then I get to share my thoughts on it. I’d definitely recommend reading her piece.
