{"id":27831,"date":"2020-03-05T17:11:32","date_gmt":"2020-03-05T23:11:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/?p=27831"},"modified":"2020-03-05T17:13:04","modified_gmt":"2020-03-05T23:13:04","slug":"metaphorical-perpetual-dull-rumble","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/2020\/03\/05\/metaphorical-perpetual-dull-rumble\/","title":{"rendered":"Metaphorical Perpetual Dull Rumble"},"content":{"rendered":"

On Lawfare<\/em><\/strong> Lennart Maschmeyer notes<\/a> how American military cyberwarfare is transitioning its operational theories:<\/p>\n

The United States Cyber Command is fundamentally changing its cyber strategy, moving from restraint and deterrence toward a posture of\u00a0persistent engagement.<\/a>\u00a0This new strategy is\u00a0better aligned<\/a>\u00a0with the practice of cyber conflict, and its innovativeness is reflected in the lively\u00a0debate<\/a>\u00a0it has generated among scholars and practitioners. Much of this debate has focused on the\u00a0lack<\/a>\u00a0of clarity<\/a>\u00a0concerning the strategy\u2019s\u00a0implementation<\/a>\u00a0and the resulting risks of\u00a0unintended consequences<\/a>. Some analysts have argued that persistent engagement could provoke\u00a0escalation<\/a>\u00a0due to misperception. Others claim it may cause\u00a0friction<\/a>\u00a0with allies and\u00a0signal<\/a>\u00a0normative acceptance of adversaries\u2019 disruptive operations. The underlying\u00a0theory<\/a>\u00a0has received less attention, however, despite its importance.<\/p>\n

The theory of \u201ccyber persistence\u201d that informs the strategy of persistent engagement is a key contribution\u00a0by Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett<\/a>. This theory rests on a crucial assumption: that the interconnectedness of modern information communications technology is the fundamental organizing principle of cyber conflict, because it places actors in a condition of constant contact. According to the theory\u2019s proponents, this condition of constant contact is what renders the adoption of a strategy of persistent engagement imperative.<\/p>\n

I argue this logic is flawed.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This is more involved than I have time to explore in detail, but I found this bit particularly interesting:<\/p>\n

Neglecting this role of secrecy leads to two pitfalls. First, the strategy of persistent engagement may inadvertently upend the existing dynamic of competition under secrecy, as perceived by adversaries, leading to unintended consequences and instability. As\u00a0scholars<\/a>\u00a0have<\/a>\u00a0noted<\/a>, past forms of competition under secrecy followed a clear set of tacitly agreed rules\u2014one key rule being the avoidance of reprisals against operational centers. As Stephen Grey\u00a0underlines<\/a>, in the Cold War intelligence contest, \u201cby tacit agreement, the superpowers never tried to assassinate each other or take reprisals.\u201d Rather than perpetuating stability under these tacitly agreed rules, persistent engagement may upend it by maneuvering \u201cas close as possible\u201d to adversary operational centers, as Gen. Paul Nakasone has\u00a0suggested<\/a>. Persistent engagement thus risks disrupting this strategic space, causing instability by signaling to adversaries that reprisals for intelligence coups affecting operational centers are now fair game. Unless the United States Cyber Command enjoys unrivaled dominance in this competition\u2014which is far from clear based on past cyber conflicts\u2014this change is likely to tie down significant resources in fending off adversary operations aiming to create the same \u201corganizational friction\u201d within Cyber Command that Fischerkeller and Harknett\u00a0propose<\/a>\u00a0to impose on adversary operational centers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Willing to take some losses – typically of intellectual resources, I would expect, rather than actual deaths and damage – in order to keep a fragile peace when the alternative is all-out war is a sensible approach to international low-level conflict. But it’s not hard to see inexperienced amateurs getting all bulgy eyed over it, is it?<\/p>\n

We’ve seen a number of incidents of ransomware over the last few years, but I am unaware as to whether the identity of the malefactors has been positively ascertained and tabulated. If we see an escalation, it’ll be interesting to hear if it’s blamed on this change operational theories – and if we decide to go back to accepting small losses in return for accomplishments of our own – think Stuxnet<\/strong><\/a> – and no stunning disasters.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On Lawfare Lennart Maschmeyer notes how American military cyberwarfare is transitioning its operational theories: The United States Cyber Command is fundamentally changing its cyber strategy, moving from restraint and deterrence toward a posture of\u00a0persistent engagement.\u00a0This new strategy is\u00a0better aligned\u00a0with the practice of cyber conflict, and its innovativeness is reflected in \u2026 Continue reading → <\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nf_dc_page":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-27831","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27831","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27831"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27831\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27833,"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27831\/revisions\/27833"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27831"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27831"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/huewhite.com\/umb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27831"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}